

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ARTICLE

Doing emotions: The role of culture in everyday emotions

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ABSTRACT

Emotional experience is culturally constructed. In this review, we discuss evidence that cultural differences in emotions are purposeful, helping an individual to meet the mandate of being a good person in their culture. We also discuss research showing that individual's fit to the cultural emotion norm is associated with well-being, and suggest that this link may be explained by the fact that normative emotions meet the cultural mandate. Finally, we discuss research that sheds light on some of the collective processes of emotion construction: social interactions and emotion representations are geared towards promoting emotions that are conducive to the cultural mandate. In conclusion, we suggest that individuals become part of their culture by "doing emotions" in a way that is consistent with the cultural mandate, and that in intercultural interactions, emotions can be literally "at cross purposes": each person's emotions are constructed to fit the purposes of their own culture.

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KEYWORDS Emotions; culture; social interactions; well-being; social construction

Introduction

Psychological studies have typically tried to capture emotion "in its purest form" by stripping it of its sociocultural context. By contrast, our research focuses precisely on the ways in which our emotional lives are socioculturally constituted. Our approach does not deny that emotions are biologically constrained, yet it takes seriously the fact that emotions are grounded in the sociocultural context in which they occur. Adopting a cultural psychology approach, we believe that emotions are "most productively analysed and understood together" with the sociocultural meanings and practices with which they co-occur (Markus & Hamedani, 2007, p. 3; see also; Adams & Markus, 2001; Shweder, 1990).

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Theories on emotions converge on the fact that emotions give meaning to attendant situations and motivate action (e.g., Barrett, 2017; Frijda, 1986). Emotions thus go beyond subjective experience, and position individuals vis-à-vis their surrounding (social) environment. Anger shows your partner that you condemn his behaviour, that he should treat you better, and that you are unlikely to accept his behaviour just like that. By being angry, you attribute meaning to your partner's behaviour (he has done wrong), claim the right to control his behaviour, and make a bid to define your relationship in the moment. Therefore, by having an emotion, individuals take a stance and (intend to) establish a connection with the world around them (Frijda, 1986; Mesquita, 2003, 2010; Solomon, 2003).

Importantly, and consistent with other models, we assume that meaning making is an active process (Barrett, 2012, 2017; Frijda, 1986; Mesquita, 2010; Mesquita & Frijda, 2011); we refer to this process as "doing emotions". Any situation or encounter is multifaceted, and individuals selectively attend and give meaning to the world around them. The same situation can be interpreted as one in which your partner wronged you, in which case you are likely to feel an emotion like anger, or alternatively, as one in which you did not earn your partner's love, in which case you would feel an emotion like sadness or even shame. Doing emotions, in this view, is consequential for the way in which individuals navigate their social environment (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994).

The idea that people "do emotions" may also have implications for the particular shape that emotions take. We conceive of doing emotions, including doing specific emotions such as anger, as an active process that involves selective attention and meaning making, and which may result in a unique emotional experience, even if it can be captured by an available emotion concept such as anger. Thus, whereas certain core characteristics are prototypical of the concept of anger (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987), the precise emotional experience associated with the concept varies across different instances and different individuals. In fact, research has found that there are no features (i.e., appraisals and action tendencies) that are either necessary or sufficient for an experience to be called anger (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003). Thus, whereas many anger instances are characterised by the readiness for confrontation or antagonism (Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Frijda & Parrott, 2011), not all are, and the (other) appraisals or action tendencies associated with anger may vary. Anger may in some instances or for some individuals be associated with mere frustration, and in other cases focus on the unjustness of the behaviour or the responsibility of another person.

Specific to the cultural psychology approach that we adopt in our research is the idea that emotional interpretations of events often serve cultural norms, ideals, or goals for how to be a good person, how to interact, how to build good relationships, or even more specifically, how to feel (Mesquita, 2003; Mesquita, Boiger, & De Leersnyder, 2016; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). We refer to these norms, ideals, or goals as "cultural mandates" to indicate that sociocultural forces are in play when individuals "do" emotions. Whether or not we blame our partner for an unpleasant situation, and thus whether or not we feel an emotion like anger, is dependent in part on whether it is culturally acceptable and normative to do so, and thus on whether it is functional within the particular sociocultural context.

Cultural mandates correspond to a shared reality that, we assume, gives direction to emotions (Barrett, 2012, 2017; Searle, 1995). The theoretical value of the concept of "cultural mandate" is not to describe a deterministic or top-down rule, but to indicate that doing emotions happens within the context of culture-specific understandings, goals, and ideals of how to be a good person or how to conduct relationships. Cultural mandates are both part of the culture around us—e.g., our habitual interactions, our customs, our language—and internalised (at least in part) by members of the culture, as values, goals, scripts that we hold dear or find normal. When particular interpretations of the situation, or particular emotions, help to achieve the central cultural mandates, they are more likely to be attended to or "selected", but when emotions interfere with the cultural mandate, they are likely to be avoided and suppressed. Therefore, "doing emotions" is a culturally meaningful act, one that references the cultural mandate(s). We do not imply that every emotion is in accordance with what is culturally mandated, if only because other forces (situational, dispositional) also operate on the emergent emotions.

Our perspective builds on theories about the social functionality of emotions (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; for recent examples, see Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Mesquita, Marinetti, & Delvaux, 2012; Parkinson, 2012), but takes them one step further to include the role of cultural mandates. Cultural mandates lend meaning to the social functions of emotions: They provide the background against which certain social outcomes are valued and embraced, and with them, the emotions that are conducive to those outcomes. Our perspective is also similar to other cultural psychology approaches to emotions, in that it proposes that sociocultural processes are important constituents of emotions (Shweder, Haidt, Horton, & Joseph, 2008; Tsai et al., 2006; Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 2004; Uchida, Townsend, Markus, & Bergsieker, 2009). The emphasis in our model is on cultural differences in the emotions that people reportedly *experience*, as opposed to

cultural differences in what they would ideally like to experience (Tsai et al., 2006), or cultural differences in the expression and perception of emotions (Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Masuda et al., 2008); however, the research to date suggests that cultural mandates also shape these other aspects of emotions.

In this article, we first review evidence that emotional practices differ across cultures in ways that can be understood from differences in cultural mandates. We then discuss research suggesting that culturally normative emotions help an individual meet the cultural mandates. Finally, we illustrate how emotional experience is socially and culturally afforded: Interpersonal interactions, linguistic representations, and children's books are all geared towards promoting culturally normative emotions, and avoiding emotions that are less desirable.

Meaningful cultural differences

Emotions have social functions: They help to achieve certain social goals, such as building social bonds, or overcoming social problems such as exclusion or loss of power (Fischer & Manstead, 2016; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Two broad classes of social goals have been distinguished: affiliative and distancing functions (Fischer & Manstead, 2016). On the one hand, emotions with an affiliative function help to "establish and maintain cooperative or harmonious relationships" (Fischer & Manstead, 2016, p. 425) with others; on the other hand, distancing emotions help "to differentiate or distance the self" from others and "even to compete with others for social status or power" (Fischer & Manstead, 2016, p. 425). Based mostly on the prototypical action tendency associated, particular emotions can be classified as primarily having an affiliative or a distancing function. For example, both positive emotions such as gratitude and love, and negative emotions such as shame and regret can help to establish or maintain bonds; and similarly, both positive emotions, such as pride about self and negative emotions such as anger and contempt can be thought to work towards distancing (Fischer & Manstead, 2016).

Previous cross-cultural research has shown that individuals from very different cultures, the United States and Japan, spontaneously organise emotions along a dimension that ranges from affiliative to distancing (Kitayama, Markus, & Negishi, 1989, as cited in Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000); Kitayama and his colleagues coined this dimension as social engagement, and defined the extremes as socially engaging (affiliative) and socially disengaging (distancing) emotions. In what follows, we adopt this terminology. The social engagement dimension does not coincide with dimensions of approach and avoidance: Anger, while belonging to

the approach category of emotions (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), tends to be confrontational, and will therefore in the short run disengage the angry person from the relationship with the target of anger (Fischer & Manstead, 2016).

While the social functions of certain emotions are similarly recognised across cultures, the meaning of these emotions is different depending on the respective cultural mandates. We predict, and have found support for, the idea that emotions that have social functions consistent with the cultural mandates are likely sought out and promoted; conversely, emotions with social functions that are inconsistent with the cultural mandates, are avoided and suppressed. The result will be that emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates will be frequent and intense, and emotions that are inconsistent will be rare (Mesquita, 2003).

The current research is built on the thesis that culturally different mandates should differently inform the ways in which people "do emotions". In the first section, we describe research showing that the prevalent and intense emotions have social functions that are consistent with the cultural mandates. In the second section, we discuss that, even when people experience similar emotions, the associated meanings (e.g., appraisals) differ according to the respective cultural mandates.

Cultural variation in the frequency and intensity of emotions

There is ample evidence from ethnographies that the most frequent and most intense emotional experiences can be understood from cultures' dominant mandates of how to be a person and how to have a relationship (Mesquita, 2003; Mesquita, De Leersnyder, & Boiger, 2016; Mesquita & Leu, 2007). For instance, the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod describes the ubiquity of shame (*haslam)* in the Awlad 'Ali, a Bedouin tribe in Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 2000). Shame is felt in any situation where a person's honour is threatened or compromised, or is at risk of being threatened; that is, in any situation where the person feels, or is at risk of feeling, weak or dependent on others (e.g., in the presence of someone higher in the hierarchy). Shame signals that an individual needs to avoid or escape from situations that threaten their honour; it is also characterised by the deferent behaviour that itself is seen to restore the person's honour. For instance, a woman facing contact with men would feel shame, which leads her to avoid or escape the encounter, and to behave in the deferent way that is seen to be fitting and honourable. In these various ways, shame would help her to live up to the cultural mandate of being honourable.

Conversely, emotions that interfere with the cultural mandate can be rare. In *Never in Anger*, the anthropologist Jean Briggs illustrates this phenomenon for the Utku Inuits of Northern Canada (Briggs, 1970).

Because the Utku Inuits depend on each other for survival during the long, severe winter, it is important for them to cultivate harmony; anger avoidance fits this aim. It is possible that in some cases anger is felt but suppressed. However, as the philosopher Robert Solomon notes (Solomon, 2007, p. 257): "What is striking, is the fact that the Utku do not, in general, blame each other.... The absence of blame means the absence of anger, at least, most forms of anger.... All I want to argue for here are the significant differences between cultures in terms of their emotional repertoires, not the absolute difference that might be indicated by the literal thesis 'never in anger'. The Utkus share with us a capacity for anger. What is striking is how little that capacity gets realised and encouraged in their culture". The point illustrated here is that the low frequency of certain emotions (in this case, anger) may also be a way to live up to the cultural mandate.

We cross-culturally tested the idea that people experience higher levels of emotions that help to achieve the cultural mandate, and lower levels of emotions that violate the cultural mandate (e.g., Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). We compared the prevalence of socially engaging and disengaging emotions in North American and Japanese samples of college students. We expected that disengaging emotions (such as pride and anger) would be more prevalent in North American contexts where the cultural mandate is one of independence, because emotions with distancing functions can be thought of as expressing and achieving independence. In contrast, we expected that socially engaging emotions (friendly feelings, shame) would be more prevalent in Japanese contexts where the cultural mandate is one of interdependence, because emotions that serve affiliative functions are consistent with this Japanese mandate.

To maximise ecological and cultural validity, we sought to test our predictions first in a daily diary study (Kitayama et al., 2006 Study 1). Participants were Japanese and American college students in their native contexts and participated in our study for 14 consecutive days. At the end of each day, participants described "the most emotional episode of the day", and then rated their experience in that situation on a list of different emotions that were selected from previous work to cover the "emotional space", as defined by the dimensions of pleasantness (positive, negative) and social engagement (socially engaged, socially disengaged). We created four theoretically derived emotion scales, each consisting of 3–4 items: positive engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings), positive disengaging emotions (e.g., pride), negative engaging emotions (e.g., shame), and negative disengaging emotions (e.g., anger). In addition to these emotion scales, we also included several emotion terms to indicate well-being or general positive emotions (e.g., happy; $N = 4$) and lack of well-being or general negative

emotions (e.g., unhappy; $N = 6$). Rating scales for all emotions ranged from 0 (not experienced it at all) to 5 (experienced it very strongly).

We expected that socially disengaging emotions would be more intense in the American context and that socially engaging emotions would be more intense in the Japanese context; the prediction was tested for positive and negative situations separately, i.e., for situations in which the intensity of general positive emotions outweighed that of general negative emotions, and for situations in which the reverse applied. All respondents reported both positive and negative situations. In testing our hypotheses, we were primarily interested in the valence-consistent emotions. Figure 1 shows the results of the diary study.

There was a significant interaction between culture and social engagement of the emotion for emotions that matched the valence of the attendant situation. For the positive situations, our predictions for positive emotions were fully borne out: North American participants reported more positive disengaging emotions, such as pride, than positive engaging emotions, such as friendly feelings, whereas Japanese reported more positive engaging emotions than positive disengaging emotions. Comparing emotions between cultures, Americans reported more positive disengaging emotions,



Figure 1. Reported intensity of experiencing positive and negative emotions that are either engaging or disengaging in positive and negative situations in Study 1. The bar attached to each mean indicates the standard error of that mean. From "Cultural Affordances and Emotional Experience: Socially Engaging and Disengaging Emotions in Japan and the United States" by S. Kitayama, B. Mesquita, and M. Karasawa, 2006, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91* (5), p. 894. Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association; reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.

such as pride, than did Japanese, but Americans and Japanese did not differ in the extent to which they reported positive engaging emotions, such as friendly feelings. For the negative situations, the intensity of negative disengaging emotions was stronger than that of negative engaging emotions in both samples. This was not predicted, but may be related to the fact that the disengaging emotions in the set tend to be higher on arousal than the engaging emotion; high arousal states tend to be experienced as more intense (Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995). Consistent with our prediction, we found that negative disengaging emotions, such as anger, were reported as experienced more strongly by Americans than they were by Japanese. Conversely, negative engaging emotions, such as shame, were stronger in the Japanese than in the American sample, although this difference did not reach significance.

These results represent the starting point of our research: Cultural differences in emotions are non-random, and can be understood in terms of differences in cultural mandates. People "do" the types of emotions that help them achieve their cultural mandates. In positive situations, North American participants underline their independence and success by experiencing emotions such as pride more than Japanese who experience very few of those emotions. In negative situations, Japanese experience negative disengaging emotions less intensely than North Americans, thereby avoiding disruptions of social harmony. Across situations, the relative intensity of experiencing valence-matched disengaging rather than engaging emotions was higher for North Americans than Japanese, $d = 1.16$, which is a large effect. Consistent with observations made in several ethnographies, we find that emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandate tend to be more intense, and emotions that violate the cultural mandate tend to be less intense.

The daily diary study provided us with self-reports of emotions in naturally occurring, ecologically and culturally valid settings. In a second study (Kitayama et al., 2006, Study 2), we set out to test whether the cultural differences in emotional experience would replicate for a standardised set of 22 social situations, derived from earlier cross-cultural work (Reyes, 1997). Examples of situations were "positive interaction with friends", "problem with a family member", "overloaded with work", and "participated in sports activities". Respondents were asked to remember the last event from their own life that fit each situation type, and to report the extent to which they had experienced each of a list of emotions in the situation. Emotions fell in the same six categories as those in Study 1, each consisting of 3–6 items: positive engaging, positive disengaging, negative engaging, negative disengaging, general positive, and general negative emotions. Respondents were Japanese and American college students.

As before, we analysed emotional intensity for positive and negative situations separately. Also as in the previous study, we defined situations as positive when the general positive emotions outweighed the general negative emotions; and as negative when the reverse was the case. Using these criteria, eight situations were cross-culturally defined as positive, eight as negative, and five as ambivalent (one situation was omitted due to a mistake in questionnaire design). For the analyses, we only considered the positive and negative situations; as in the previous study, we focused on the emotions that matched the valence of the situation (see Figure 2).

Generally, cultural differences in the prevalent emotions could be understood in terms of differences in cultural mandates. In the positive situations, both Americans and Japanese reportedly experienced the engaging emotions (friendly feelings) more strongly than the disengaging emotions (pride)—a pattern that differs from the one found in Study 1 for the American group, as they then reported more disengaging than engaging emotions. It is possible that the set of stimulus situations in Study 2 differed from the types of situations American participants encountered in their daily lives (Study 1); if this were the case, the pattern of differences as found under Study 1 is partly due to differences in the ecology of interactions (see more about this source of differences under *Interpersonal Antecedent*



Figure 2. Reported intensity of experiencing positive and negative emotions that are either engaging or disengaging in positive and negative situations in Study 2. From "Cultural Affordances and Emotional Experience: Socially Engaging and Disengaging Emotions in Japan and the United States" by S. Kitayama, B. Mesquita, and M. Karasawa, 2006, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91* (5), p. 898. Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association; reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.

Situations, below). As predicted, the difference between the level of engaging and disengaging emotions was reliably greater for the Japanese than the Americans. From the perspective of comparing the cultural groups, and replicating the results of Study 1, the disengaging emotions (e.g., pride) were reported as being experienced more strongly by the American than by the Japanese respondents, whereas the engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) were experienced to an equal extent in both cultural groups. In the negative situations, the pattern of emotions replicated that of Study 1: Both American and Japanese respondents reported more disengaging (e.g., anger) than engaging (e.g., shame) emotions, but the difference was more pronounced in the American than in the Japanese sample. Across situations, the relative intensity of experiencing valence-matched disengaging rather than engaging emotions was higher for North Americans than Japanese, $d = 1.46$, which is a large effect.

Thus, while the differences were more pronounced in the diary study than they were in the event-based self-reports, they are in the same direction. Disengaging emotions, both positive and negative, are experienced more intensely by Americans, whereas engaging emotions are experienced more intensely by Japanese. By experiencing certain emotions more than others, American college students presumably achieved their cultural mandate of independence, whereas Japanese college students presumably achieved their cultural mandate of interdependence. As in the ethnographies, we find that people "do" the emotions that help them to meet the cultural mandate.

Cultural variation in the content of emotional experience

Our prevalence studies started from emotions that were cross-culturally similar on two dimensions of meaning: valence and social engagement. This similarity in meaning allowed us to compare the intensity of emotional experience across cultures. However, similarities on some core dimensions do not imply that the meaning of emotion words is invariant in other ways (for a similar view, see Wierzbicka, 1999). People in different cultures may "do" particular emotions differently. This is the type of cultural variability that we investigated in two studies to be discussed next.

Starting point for this line of research is the idea that people across cultures construct emotional experience in concrete settings (Barrett & Russell, 2014; Boiger & Mesquita, 2014). In the first study, we investigated cultural differences in the situated instances of anger and shame experiences, showing that the dominant constructions of emotional experience within certain situations differ across cultures (Boiger et al., 2017). Following other studies of emotional content, we focused on two components: the associated interpretation of the attended emotional event (i.e., the

appraisal) and the readiness to act upon the event (or *action tendency*) (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Scherer, 1984). For example, the content of anger may consist of the *appraisals* that the event is negative, that it is frustrating, that it is unjust, or that the offender can be blamed for it; it also may consist of *action tendencies* such as the tendency to control the situation, confront the other person, or retaliate. For any anger experience, all or some of these appraisals and action tendencies may be present; anger experiences can thus be described as a configuration of appraisals and action tendencies, also called a *component configuration* (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989).

Cross-cultural research on the content of emotions has typically compared the appraisals and/or action tendencies associated with certain emotions. Some of this research aims to find cultural invariance in the component configuration for a given emotion (e.g., Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2011; Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006), whereas other research aims at finding meaningful cultural differences (Mesquita, 2001; Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, & Thapa, 1995; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Yet, all of the existing studies have taken a rather static approach, assuming that certain appraisals and action tendencies are invariantly associated with a given emotion within a particular culture, even if component configurations were found to differ between cultures.

In the first study, we started from the idea that people can construct a given emotion differently in different instances. Taking a novel approach to studying cultural variation in emotion, we examined the component constellations that were in each culture associated with anger and shame within concrete settings. We found that the experience of a given emotion was cross-culturally associated with more than one component configuration. Moreover, we showed cultural differences in the component configurations that people draw on most for a given emotion (Boiger et al., 2017). In this study, we examined within-culture distributions of different configurations associated with anger and shame in three cultures: the United States, Japan, and Belgium.

To test these predictions, we started out with an extensive bottom-up sampling of anger and shame situations, appraisals and action tendencies in each of the cultures; situations, appraisals, and action tendencies were carefully selected to be both ecologically valid and representative for all cultures included. Anger and shame situations were selected based on our previous research in the US, Japan, and Belgium (Boiger, De Deyne, & Mesquita, 2013; Boiger, Mesquita, Uchida, & Barrett, 2013). In these studies, we had collected anger and shame situations from interviews and experience sampling of anger and shame antecedents in each culture (see below for more details on the situation sampling procedure). Subsequently, we took random samples stratified by culture and gender of those

antecedents and presented them to 81 US, 79 Japanese, and 60 Belgian students in a card-sorting task. We subjected the card-sort data to multidimensional scaling and selected 15 anger and 15 shame situations (5 from each culture) that covered the respective two-dimensional spaces (anger dimensions: intentionality and relational closeness; shame dimensions: private vs. public self-violations and self vs. other agency). We then asked more than 900 American, Japanese, and Belgian students, in relation to a set of 15 anger or 15 shame situations, to tell us how they would appraise the situation (in terms of 8 appraisals) and what they would feel like doing about it (in terms of 9 action tendencies). For example, participants would read about a shame situation in which "Jessica had two overlapping classes and was therefore too late for her second class. The professor complained that she was late again and the entire room was looking at her". Participants then indicated to what extent they would, e.g., "feel that [they] failed in terms of other people's expectations" or "feel like apologising to other people" if they were in Jessica's situation.

To identify whether there were multiple ways of experiencing anger and shame that differed across cultures, we made use of a classification model for individual differences in situated processes, called CLASSI (Ceulemans & Van Mechelen, 2008). CLASSI identifies participants who share a pattern of similar appraisals and action tendencies within either anger or shame situations, thereby simultaneously identifying different types of emotional constructions or experiences and classifying participants into these types. There were two different types of experiencing anger and three types of experiencing shame. As predicted, the distributions of these emotional experience types varied systematically across cultures: We found that most Japanese (>95%) fell into one type of experiencing anger, while most Belgians and Americans fell into the other. For shame, the established experience types not only distinguished between "East" and "West", as they did for anger but also formed one culturally dominant type of experiencing shame in each culture with up to 90% of all participants from one culture falling into the same type. The contents of people's emotional experience across situations were sufficiently different across cultures to be able to predict a person's cultural origin with 72.3% accuracy for anger and 74.0% accuracy for shame, based solely on how they appraised the 15 situations and how they felt like acting upon them.

These findings show that cultural differences clearly emerge when looking at the content of emotional experience in concrete settings. This is noteworthy, as emotion researchers have frequently assumed that cultural variation in emotional experience enters the picture via different contingencies between situations and people's responses (Imada & Ellsworth, 2011; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Roseman et al., 1995). However, cross-cultural research on emotion has all but neglected the situational ecology of

emotional experience. Studying these context-specific practices not only closes a gap between theoretical propositions and empirical findings, but also captures the heterogeneity of emotional experience in ways that are much closer to people's actual experience in daily life.

While this study found systematic cultural differences in the content of people's emotional experiences, the breadth of information taken into consideration made it difficult to establish if these cultural differences were also meaningful: The patterns of emotional experience for each of the established types were highly complex, with participants' ratings of emotional experience varying over 15 different situations. However, we found that much of the differences between person types was found in the appraisal component of other-blame (for anger) and other-esteem (for shame). In the second study, we studied systematic cultural differences in the contents of anger and shame using a different study design (Boiger, Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Mesquita, 2016).

In this study, we examined people's emotional *appraisals* of anger and shame situations in daily life. Around 100 North American and Japanese students completed a daily diary for 7 consecutive days. Each day, they recounted their most important anger and shame event of the day and answered questions about these events. The students also rated the reported situations on dimensions that in previous research cross-culturally defined the domains of anger and shame antecedents, respectively. In the case of anger, they were asked whether the situation in which they felt angry was with someone close or distant; previous research indicated that situations with close vs. distant others are differentially associated with the experience of anger in the US and Japan (Boiger et al., 2013; Park et al., 2013; Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, & Kudoh, 1988). For shame experiences, they were asked whether the situation was publicly seen or privately felt; again these kinds of situations are differentially related to shame antecedents in the US and Japan (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013; Crystal, Parrott, Okazaki, & Watanabe, 2001).

Subsequently participants indicated how they appraised the situation that they had experienced that day. We focused on two appraisals of anger—whether they themselves or others were to be blamed for what happened—and two appraisals of shame—whether they focused on themselves or on the opinion of others during the shameful event. These appraisals were chosen to reflect the relative focus on autonomy and a first-person perspective in the United States vs. the relative focus on relatedness and a third-person perspective in Japan (Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Crystal et al., 2001; Mascolo, Fischer, & Li, 2003; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004); they had also emerged as important bottom-up factors of anger and shame appraisals in our previous research (Boiger et al., 2017). As expected, we found that Americans and Japanese, each focused on the

appraisals that were consistent with their respective cultural mandates. In anger situations, North American students blamed others rather than themselves (irrespective of the other being close or distant), thus protecting their autonomy. Japanese also blamed others rather than themselves in anger situations with distant others (and even more so than the Americans), but blamed themselves relatively more in anger situations with close others, thereby protecting their relationships with those close others. In shame situations, Americans focused relatively more on how the shameful event affected themselves rather than on what others were thinking about them, regardless of whether the situation was rather public or private. Japanese showed an appraisal focus similar to the Americans in situations in which they felt their shame privately. However, when they found themselves in situations of public exposure, Japanese were much more concerned than the Americans with how others were perceiving them; these situations may have been particularly relevant to the Japanese mandate of saving face and relatedness.

In sum, people appear to construct their experience of a given emotion within a particular situation in ways that match the cultural mandates. Cultural differences in the experience of emotions are non-random and substantial (see also Mesquita, 2001), but more pertinent to the new approach presented here, cultural differences in emotional experience are better described as the results of situational constructions than as stable characteristics of the emotion in a particular culture. We propose that cultural mandates guide and afford people's active construction of meaning in a given situation, and therefore, the emotions that people in that culture experience (Barrett, 2012, 2017; Boiger & Mesquita, 2014; Mesquita & Boiger, 2014).

In all, our research suggests that emotional experience, whether described at the level of emotion concepts or at the level of component configurations, is better described and understood when connecting it to cultural mandates. Both at the level of the emotions that are frequently and intensely experienced and at the level of the emotional content or component constellations, people report more of those experiences that help them to be good and typical members of their culture.

Culturally normative emotions predict well-being

If we assume that an individual's well-being is based on how well they adjust to the social challenges they encounter, then having emotions that presumably help to achieve the cultural mandate should be an important predictor of well-being. This idea resonates with other findings that suggest that enacting one's cultural mandate predicts well-being (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003). For instance, "personal control" and "self-esteem", which can

be seen as enactments of the cultural mandate of autonomy and independence, were found to be predictors of well-being in the United States; in contrast, "absence of relational strain" and "relationship harmony", as enactments of the cultural mandate of relatedness and interdependence, predicted well-being in various East Asian contexts (Kang, Shaver, Sue, Min, & Jing, 2003; Kitayama, Karasawa, Curhan, Ryff, & Markus, 2010). Based on these findings, we expect that emotions that help to realise the cultural mandate will be associated with well-being.

Several of our studies have yielded evidence in support of the idea that culturally normative emotions are associated with well-being. The first evidence came from our research with North American and Japanese college students (see above; Kitayama et al., 2006) In this study, well-being items were measured by a scale consisting of general positive emotions. We predicted well-being either in relation to the "most emotional episode of the day" (Study 1; 14-day study), or in relation to the "different types of emotional situations" (Study 2; 21 different types). Using multilevel analyses, we regressed the mean of general positive emotions for all 14 (or 21) emotional situations on the corresponding ratings of positive *engaging* emotions and positive *disengaging* emotions, respectively.

In both studies, general positive emotions ("happiness") were predicted by the mean intensity of positive engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings), as well as the mean intensity of positive disengaging emotions (e.g., pride). This was true in both cultures, suggesting that happiness is cross-culturally achieved both by feeling connected with others and by feeling proud. However, as expected, cultural differences occurred in the magnitude of these effects, such that happiness was most strongly associated with emotions that fit the cultural mandate (see Table 1). Comparing the effects *across* cultures, socially engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) were a stronger predictor of well-being for Japanese than for North Americans, whereas socially disengaging emotions (e.g., pride) were a stronger predictor of well-being for Americans than for Japanese. Comparing the effects

Table 1. Regression coefficients that predict general positive emotion as a function of engaging positive emotion (e.g., friendly feelings) and disengaging positive emotion (e.g., self-esteem) within each individual for Study 1 and Study 2.

	Predicting general positive emotion (e.g., happiness)			
	Study 1		Study 2	
Culture	Engaging emotion	Disengaging emotion	Engaging emotion	Disengaging emotion
Japanese	0.68	0.27	0.61	0.30
American	0.50	0.60	0.41	0.65

Adapted from "Cultural Affordances and Emotional Experience: Socially Engaging and Disengaging Emotions in Japan and the United States" by S. Kitayama, B. Mesquita, and M. Karasawa, 2006, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91* (5), p. 895, p. 899. Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association; reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.

within cultures further confirmed our expectation: For Japanese, happiness was predicted more strongly by the intensity of positive engaging emotions (e.g., friendly feelings) than positive disengaging emotions (e.g., pride); for North Americans, happiness was more strongly associated with positive disengaging than positive engaging emotions (although this latter difference did not reach statistical significance in Study 1). In conclusion, disengaging emotions that appear to be conducive to the cultural mandate for autonomy and independence best predicted happiness in the United States, whereas engaging emotions that are conducive to the cultural mandate for relatedness and interdependence best predicted happiness in Japan.

A study by Tsai and her colleagues similarly suggested that well-being is associated with a culture's most valued emotional states (Tsai et al., 2006). That study showed that depression (i.e., ill-being) was cross-culturally associated with the discrepancy between individuals' "actual" emotions and their "ideal" emotions. The researchers compared European American and Hong Kong Chinese samples because cultural mandates are known to differ between these cultures. Ideal emotions in those samples have been shown to differ, with European Americans putting a higher value on high arousal positive (HAP) states (excited, enthusiastic, and strong), and Chinese putting a higher value on low arousal positive (LAP) states (calm, peaceful, and relaxed; Tsai et al., 2006). Tsai has shown that ideal emotions are those that allow an individual to realise the cultural mandate, which in US contexts is to influence others (and thereby reach individual goals), whereas in Chinese contexts it is to adjust to others (and thereby achieve relational harmony; Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007). Linking emotions to ill-being, Tsai and colleagues found that depression is associated with discrepancies between actual and ideal HAP emotions for European Americans, but with discrepancies between actual and ideal LAP emotions for Hong Kong Chinese. In other words, the absence of well-being (i.e., depression) was a function of people's failure to experience their culture's ideal emotions—which is a failure to experience emotions that help to achieve the cultural mandate.

We recently replicated the link between well-being and the experience of culturally normative emotions in a different way (De Leersnyder, Kim, & Mesquita, 2015a). In this study, we inferred the cultural norm for emotions by taking the cultural average of the ratings on 20–30 emotions for a particular type of situation. We imagine it would be hard to guess what the average person in your culture answered on 20–30 scales for a specific type of situation. It is, therefore, unlikely that participants were aware of the cultural norm, let alone were able to adjust their reporting to it. We think of this study as an implicit measure of emotional fit therefore.

In this study, we compared participants from three cultural contexts: European Americans, Belgians, and Koreans. These cultures were chosen

for their profoundly different cultural mandates. In the United States, the mandate is to be autonomous, independent, successful, and unique, especially in work situations (Kitayama & Imada, 2010; Kitayama et al., 2009; Sanchez-Burks, Uhlmann, & Carlyle, 2014; Schwartz & Ros, 1995). In Korea, the mandate is to be related and interdependent, especially in family situations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Neuliep, 2011; Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000). In Belgium, the mandate is to be autonomous, yet only to the extent that this does not jeopardise relatedness (Boiger et al., 2013; Schwartz & Ros, 1995), an issue that is important in both work and family contexts.

To measure well-being, we administered the World Health Organization's Quality of Life Scale (Skevington, Lotfy, & O'Connell, 2004; WHOQOL, 1995) that captures psychological, relational, physical, and environmental well-being, and has been validated for a large range of cultures. In this study, we focused on psychological well-being, while controlling for all other types of well-being (i.e., relational, physical, and environmental well-being); psychological well-being measures a positive sense of self and the absence of depression.

We measured cultural fit to normative emotions by administering the Emotional Patterns Questionnaire (EPQ; De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011). The EPQ consists of a prompt that is defined by valence (positive vs. negative), social engagement (autonomy-promoting vs. relatedness-promoting), and social context (work/school vs. home/family, and in some studies friends). Participants describe a situation from their own recent past that matches the prompt, and rate the intensity of their emotions in that situation using a list of emotion scales. The emotion scales together cover the domain of emotional experience (De Leersnyder et al., 2011). The intensity ratings of the full set of emotions (20 in the European American and Korean Studies, and 34 in the Belgian study) constitute an individual's emotional pattern for a specific type of situation. Based on these patterns, we established participants' *emotional fit with culture* (*EFC*) by (i) establishing a "cultural average" pattern of emotional responses for each type of situation (i.e., type of prompt) and (ii) correlating each individuals' pattern of emotional experience with the corresponding average pattern of experience in their own culture (see Figure 3 for a visual representation). To avoid inflation of the emotional fit scores, we always excluded the individual's own pattern of responses from the corresponding cultural average pattern.

As expected, cultural fit of emotions cross-culturally predicted psychological well-being, as measured by the WHOQOL instrument; however, it did so *only* for those domains that are central to the realisation of the respective cultural mandates (De Leersnyder, Kim, & Mesquita, 2015a). For European Americans, psychological well-being was associated with cultural fit in autonomy-promoting situations at work only (R^2 change = 0.114, p = 0.01, when



Figure 3. Visual representation of data obtained by the Emotional Patterns Questionnaire. Top half of the Figure shows the emotional patterns of two individuals; bottom half shows the cultural average pattern of emotions. All patterns of emotion were reported in response to a self-reported situation that matched a negative, autonomy-promoting prompt. *Emotional Fit with Culture* is measured by correlating each individual's pattern of emotion to the matching cultural average pattern. Here, *r* stands for the raw correlation between each individaul's pattern and the average pattern below; *EFC* stands for the Fisher transformed correlation score. Example inspired by data reported in De Leersnyder et al. (2011), study 2.

including the interaction between *context* (i.e., work vs. family) and *EFC in autonomy-promoting situations* in the regression model). These situations primarily afford either positive disengaging emotions such as pride or negative disengaging emotions such as anger and frustration–emotions that can be thought to embody the US cultural mandate of autonomy. For Koreans, psychological well-being was associated with cultural fit in relatedness-promoting situations at home only (R^2 change = 0.024, $p = 0.047$, when including the interaction between *context* (i.e., work vs. family) and *EFC in relatedness-promoting situations* in the regression model). These types of situations afford either positive or negative engaging emotions (e.g., closeness, shame)–emotions that are conducive to the cultural mandate of being closely related to family members. Finally, in the Belgian context, psychological well-being was associated with cultural fit in both autonomy-promoting and relatedness-promoting situations, regardless of the valence of the situation or the context (R^2 change = 0.037, $p = 0.002$, when including *EFC in autonomy-promoting situations* and *EFC in relatedness-promoting situations* in the regression model). The results are in line with the Belgian cultural mandate of egalitarian autonomy, which combines autonomy and relatedness.

The link between cultural fit of emotions and psychological well-being held true after controlling not only for other types of well-being as measured by the WHOQOL but also for age, gender, socio-economic status. Overall, the findings are consistent with the idea that fit with the normative cultural emotions is beneficial to an individual when these emotions help them to achieve cultural tasks. Importantly, in this new research, we focused on a larger range of emotions as they occurred in specific types of situations, and we calculated individuals' cultural fit by comparing their emotion ratings to the average emotion ratings in their culture for that specific type of situation. It is hard to imagine that participants were aware of the cultural average on such a large range of emotions, which makes the EPQ less susceptible to social desirable responding. Together, the research here discussed supports the idea that doing emotions in ways that are culturally fitting is key to an individual's adjustment.

Sociocultural environments scaffold the ways individuals do emotions

People never "do emotions" in a vacuum; instead, emotions-in-action take place in sociocultural contexts that themselves embody the cultural mandates (e.g., Markus & Conner, 2013; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). The studies discussed next illustrate how interpersonal and collective processes scaffold the ways in which individuals "do emotions". One set of cross-cultural studies suggests that prevalent interpersonal situations afford emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates, while avoiding

emotions that violate the cultural mandates. Another study suggests more detailed interpersonal scripts for emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates. Finally, we discuss research suggesting that cultural products, such as children's books and language representations, afford ways of doing emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates.

Interpersonal processes

Interpersonal antecedent situations

A series of studies with US American, Japanese, Turkish, and Belgian participants suggests that interpersonal processes within a given culture afford and promote emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates. In these studies, we showed that the situations that people encounter frequently and the situations that they associate most strongly with an emotion differ across cultures in ways that can be understood from central cultural mandates. In all of these studies, we focused on the cultural affordances of anger (a disengaging emotion) and shame (an engaging emotion). Anger is an emotion that helps people get what they want—an outcome that is in line with the US cultural mandate of autonomy and self-assertion but violates the Japanese cultural mandate of relational harmony. In contrast, shame is an emotion that highlights when things have gone wrong in the eyes of others—information that is highly undesirable against the backdrop of the US cultural mandate in which high self-esteem is valued, but that furthers the Japanese mandate of relational harmony with others by acknowledging areas of improvement.

In the first study, we examined whether American and Japanese participants encounter more situations that elicit culturally condoned emotions (anger in the United States, shame in Japan) and fewer situations that elicit culturally condemned emotions (shame in the United States, anger in Japan) (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013). We presented participants with a set of interpersonal anger and shame situations that were sampled from interviews, in which 20 Americans and 19 Japanese reported in detail on their salient anger and shame experiences, and experience sampling, in which 53 Americans and 50 Japanese reported on their emotions and antedecedent situations four times a day during a week, and from which we then selected interpersonal situations that elicited anger or shame. These situational descriptions were scripted into short vignettes that contained the ongoing activity of the protagonist, the relationship between the actors involved, and the specific event that triggered anger or shame; from this pool of emotional antecedents, we randomly selected 20 anger and 20 shame situations from each culture (stratified by gender). An example of a shame situation from Japan is: "It was the first time that Rachel had made a particular dish for her family. They had started to eat and no one said

anything. When Rachel joined them at the table and took her first bite, she realized that the food was inedible". We asked US and Japanese students to tell us for each situation how likely it was that most students they know would experience a situation like this and, if it were to happen, how likely they would be to feel anger (in the anger-version of the questionnaire) or shame (in the shame-version of the questionnaire). To test whether situations are culturally promoted (and thus occur more frequently) to the extent that they elicit culturally condoned emotions, we regressed the frequency of the situations on their emotion-eliciting power in each culture, using multilevel regression. Figure 4 shows the beta weights of the slopes from these multilevel regressions for situations for the United States and Japan (the Turkish and Belgian results are explained below). We only display the beta weights for own-culture situations (e.g., Japanese participants rating Japanese-origin situations), which make the beta weights comparable across cultures.

In line with our predictions, we found that interpersonal situations were promoted (i.e., frequent) to the extent that they elicited stronger condoned



Figure 4. Perceived promotion and avoidance of anger and shame situation in four cultures. Beta weights of random slopes predicting situation frequency from the situation's emotion-eliciting power for own-culture situations (mult ilevel models with situations nested in participants). Error bars show standard errors. The U S and Japanese data from M. Boiger, B. Mesquita, Y. Uchida, and L.F. Barrett (2013), *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39*(4), p. 545. Copyright 2013 by Taylor & Francis; reprinted by permission of SAGE Publication, Inc.; Turkish data from M. Boiger, D. Gungor, M. Karasawa, & B. Mesquita (2014), *Cognition and Emotion, 28*(7). Copyright 2014 by Taylor & Francis; reprinted by permission of SAGE Publication; Belgian data from M. Boiger, S. De Deyne, & B. Mesquita (2013).

emotions (anger in the US, shame in Japan; positive bars in Figure 4) and avoided (i.e., rare) to the extent that they elicited stronger condemned emotions (shame in the US, anger in Japan; negative bars in Figure 4). In other words, people frequently encounter those situations that elicit more of the emotions that help them fulfil their respective cultural mandates.

We found the same pattern of results when we pooled situations that were taken from participants' own cultural context with those that had originated in the other cultural context. However, the result was more pronounced for own-culture situations, which suggests that the processes involved in promoting culturally normative emotions go beyond mere cognitive bias: Situations from a participant's own culture appear to be particularly relevant and "boost" the participant's perception in the direction of what is culturally meaningful. It is plausible that situations within a cultural context have been selected over time, favouring those situations that are structured in ways that are aligned with the respective cultural mandates (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit 1997; Savani, Morris, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2011). Consequently, the daily ecology of emotional experience in the US and Japan comes to differ in ways that afford people the opportunities of being good and typical members of their culture.

What characterises these highly emotional situations that people commonly encounter in the US and Japan? In an additional card-sort study, we found differences in the kinds of situations that are considered emotionally intense in the US and Japan (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013). In this study, we asked American and Japanese students to sort the same situations as those used in the previous study into as many groups as they saw fit. Using individual difference multidimensional scaling, we identified two cross-culturally common dimensions for both anger situations (relational closeness and intentionality) and shame situations (type of self-violation and agency, see Figure 5). While the dimensional structure underlying these situations was comparable across cultures, there were meaningful differences in the dimensions that participants considered emotionally intense: Situations that touched upon the respective cultural mandates of independence and interdependence were perceived to elicit stronger emotions. The American participants perceived situations with close others to be more anger-provoking (regardless of the intentions of these close others), possibly because independence and autonomy are particularly at stake in these kinds of relationships. In comparison, Japanese found it particularly upsetting when close others were being inconsiderate, underlining a Japanese concern for social norm violations (Ohbuchi et al., 2004). Cultural differences in what was considered shame-provoking were even more pronounced (see Figure 5): the US participants perceived it most shameful when others pointed out their personal flaws, thus undermining their predominant cultural concern for positive self-regard and autonomy from others' judgment (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010). Japanese participants



Figure 5. The characteristics of shameful situations in the US and Japan. Non-metric individual difference scaling (weighted, rotated). Normalised raw stress = .066. From "Condoned or Condemned: The Situational Affordance of Anger and Shame in the United States and Japan" by M. Boiger, B. Mesquita, Y. Uchida, and L.F. Barrett, 2013, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(4), p. 548. Copyright 2013 by Taylor & Francis; reprinted by permission of SAGE Publication, Inc.

perceived the very opposite kind of situation to be most shameful—situations in which they made themselves look bad in public; these kinds of situations highlight failure to live up to the Japanese concern for keeping face and for monitoring one's behaviour when interacting with others (Kim et al., 2010).

In subsequent research, we moved beyond the comparison of independent and interdependent cultures, showing differences in emotion-affording situations between North America and Belgium, both cultures with independent mandates (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013), and between situational affordances in Japan and Turkey, both cultures with interdependent mandates (Boiger, Güngör, Karasawa, & Mesquita, 2014). We proposed that the Belgian variant of independence differs from the US in that it emphasises

egalitarianism and social conformity at the expense of competition and self-assertion, which are more typical of the US variant. To test this prediction, we sampled anger and shame situations from interviews on salient anger and shame experiences with 37 Belgian students and from week-long daily diaries of daily anger and shame experiences with 39 Belgian students. Analogous to our previous research, we scripted these into short situation vignettes, took a random sample of 20 anger/shame situations, and presented these to a new sample of $N = 112$ (Dutch-speaking) Belgian students. We asked these students the same questions as in our previous research—how likely it is that most students they know encounter these situations and how likely it is that these situations would make the students feel angry/ashamed. We then compared these newly collected Belgian data against those from our previous study in the US (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013). In line with the more egalitarian approach in Belgium, anger was found to be neither promoted nor avoided in Belgium (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013; see Figure 4), arguably because anger is acceptable as an expression of independence but eschewed once it trespasses on the independence of others; shame was promoted to a similar extent as in Japan, underlining the relatively stronger emphasis on social conformity in Belgium. The situational affordance of anger and shame in line with what is culturally condoned or condemned also held for different mandates *within* the broad category of independent cultures.

In Turkey, we expected that the cultural mandate of interdependence would revolve around defending honour compared to the Japanese concern with keeping face (Kim et al., 2010). Both honour and face highlight the notion that individual worth is socially determined (thus promoting shame in both cultures), but they imply a different stance regarding the desirable course of action when an individual's worth is challenged: Turkish honour ideals emphasise the need to actively defend honour by retaliation (thus promoting anger; see also Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), whereas Japanese face ideals stress the importance of accepting external judgments and co-operating with others to prevent future face loss (thus avoiding anger). We reused the pool of Japanese anger and shame situations from our previous research (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013) and collected a new sample of anger/shame situations in Turkey; different from the Japanese situations, which were sampled from interviews and experience sampling, we sampled the Turkish situations through daily diaries on anger and shame experiences with 50 Turkish students to yield a blend of salient and daily events. We then presented a random selection of 16 of these Turkish situations and 16 Japanese situations to Turkish and Japanese students ($N = 319$). Each random selection of situations was stratified such that half of the situations were selected to be with close others, half with distant others; additionally, we stratified our situation samples by gender. In line with our predictions,

we replicated the previous results for Japan (the data from this second sample are not shown in Figure 4, but are reported in Boiger, Güngör et al., 2014): Anger situations were perceived to be avoided and shame situations promoted. We also found that emotional affordances in Turkey could be understood in terms of the cultural mandate of defending honour—Turkish students were the only group who reported that both anger and shame situations were promoted in their culture (Boiger, Güngör et al., 2014; see Figure 4 for own-culture situations; the pattern was weaker yet identical for the pooled same- and other-culture situations). Moreover, the affordance of culturally condoned emotions varied in predictable ways not only between Turkey and Japan but also within the two cultures between situations that involved close vs. distant others and male vs. female protagonists: In line with the idea that honour and face concerns are more salient in interactions with distant than close others (Ito, 2000; Kardam, 2005), we found more pronounced patterns of promotion and avoidance in situations with distant others. Furthermore, consistent with the notion that honour (but not face) is gendered (Cihangir, 2012; Shimanoff, 1994), we found that Turkish participants perceived more pronounced shame promotion in situations with female protagonists. Again, differences in the situational affordances of anger and shame in Japan and Turkey could be understood from differences in cultural mandates.

Interpersonal scripts

We also explored whether people have more elaborate interpersonal scripts for dealing with emotions that are conducive to the cultural mandate (anger in Germany, shame in Japan). We argued that this should be the case because culturally normative emotions are typically subject to interpersonal regulation (Boiger, Riediger, Uchida, & Mesquita, 2016).We tested this assumption by exploring German and Japanese scripts for anger and shame interactions between romantic partners. Because anger is beneficial for the German goal of relational autonomy and commonly experienced in close relationships, we expected Germans to have more elaborate interpersonal scripts for dealing with anger than Japanese. For shame, which is more helpful for maintaining the Japanese goal of relational harmony, we expected the opposite pattern. German adults (N = 96, 51.0% female, M_{age} = 29.3, SD_{age} = 2.9) and Japanese adults (N = 88, 51.7% female, M_{age} = 33.0, SD_{age} = 3.0) read eight anger (or shame) situations and reported on how they thought each situation would unfold with their romantic partner. These situations had been sampled from our previous pool of anger and shame situations reported by young adults in Western Europe/Japan (interview and experience sampling; Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013; Boiger et al., 2014; Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013). For each situation, participants indicated their anger or shame script by rating how intensely

they would feel and show anger/shame (among other emotions), how they thought their partners would react to them (in terms of 11 emotions) if they responded in this way, and how angry/ashamed and dissatisfied they would feel with their relationship after that interaction.

Consistent with our predictions, German anger scripts were more interpersonal in nature: Compared to Japanese, the outcomes of German anger scripts depended more on the expected partner reactions. For example, German participants expected to feel less angry at the end of the imagined interaction than at the beginning if their partner responded more submissively (i.e., by feeling ashamed, understanding, or sorry); this was not the case for the Japanese participants. Germans thus took their partner's (mitigating) reactions into account when assessing how angry an interaction would make them feel, whereas Japanese appeared to consider anger, once elicited, as an emotion that is not regulated interpersonally. We observed the opposite pattern for shame: Supporting our predictions, the outcome of Japanese shame scripts was almost entirely determined by the expected responses of the partner, while German scripts were largely unaffected by partners' responses. In each of the two cultures, people appear to be more acquainted with interpersonally handling those emotions that help them achieve their cultural mandates and consequently develop scripts that attune them to others in reaching desirable outcomes.

Collective processes

Cultural products, such as children's books and language representations, afford ways of doing emotions that are consistent with the cultural mandates. In one study, we found that popular children's books in Belgium and the United States featured emotions that were consistent with the cultural mandates (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013). In this study, we analysed 19 popular children's books from the US and 19 popular children's books from Belgium. The books in our sample were not necessarily created in the country in question, but were the books that parents purchased most frequently and thus presumably considered most appropriate for their children. Each book was coded for the number of anger and shame episodes it portrayed. In both cultures, about one-quarter of the children's books contained at least one anger episode. However, one-quarter of the Belgian children's books also contained shame episodes, whereas none of the books from the US did so. Interestingly, the Belgian books with anger episodes overlapped with those that contained shame episodes: In these books, the protagonist tended to feel angry early in the story and then come to regret those feelings and display shame later on. Shame in these books may

function as a "socialising emotion" (Röttger-Rössler, Scheidecker, Funk, & Holodynski, 2015; Röttger-Rössler, Scheidecker, Jung, & Holodynski, 2013): In line with Belgian egalitarian ideals, these stories link the experience of anger with regret and shame, conveying the idea that anger may be felt at times, but can have harmful consequences that are best avoided.

Emotions are also represented in one of the most critical cultural products of all: language. In an analysis of linguistic representations, we compared the actions commonly associated with anger and shame in (US) English and (Flemish) Dutch. Specifically, we focused on actions reflecting the level of acceptance of each of these emotions in ways consistent with the cultural mandates (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013). This study took a very different approach from that used in our previous research: Instead of asking people what they would feel like doing in specific situations, we analysed word associations of anger and shame concepts in existing large-scale word association data from the United States and Belgium. We expected actions that "yield" to the emotion (aggression for anger and closeness-seeking for shame) to be associated with condoned emotions (anger in the US, shame in Belgium) and actions that "contain" the emotion (distancing for anger and suppression for shame) to be associated with condemned emotions (shame in the US, anger to some extent in Belgium). Large samples of Americans (N = 38,497) and (Dutch-speaking) Belgians (N = 63,729) provided the first associations that came to mind for a total of 7,006 English and 12,571 Dutch cue words. Based on previous research, we identified anger and shame words as well as yielding and containing action words among the cue words in both languages. We then calculated for each emotion-action word-pair the similarity in the network. To do this, we first looked up the associations that people had produced in response to each of the emotion (e.g., "anger") or action (e.g., "yell") cue words. We then calculated how similar the distribution of these assocations were for each emotion-action word-pair (e.g., the similarity between "anger" and "yell" or between "annoy" and "hit"). Finally, we averaged these similarities for each predicted association between emotion and action (e.g., all anger and all aggression words) per emotion and language. Permutation tests using Monte Carlo approximations based on 100,000 random permutations partially confirmed our predictions (see Figure 6). Although anger was more strongly associated with aggression than with distancing in both cultures, the relative difference was less pronounced in Belgium; it appears that Belgian anger carries the expected ambivalent meaning of wanting both to aggress and to distance oneself from the situation. For shame, suppressing the emotion was the dominant action in the US, whereas the restorative potential of shame through seeking closeness to others was relatively



Figure 6. The actions associated with anger and shame in US English and Belgian Dutch. Similarity (cosined) between emotion words and words reflecting emotional responses in the United States and Belgium. From "Emotions in 'the world': Cultural practices, products, and meanings of anger and shame in two individualist cultures" by M. Boiger, S. De Deyne, and B. Mesquita, 2016, *Frontiers in Psychology, 4*, p. 11.

more emphasised in Belgium. Therefore, word associations can be thought to scaffold the ways individuals in the respective cultures "do emotions".

Conclusion and future directions

Emotional experience, idiosyncratic and personally unique as it may feel, is saturated with cultural meaning. Therefore, individuals "doing emotions" are cultural actors by necessity. Cultural mandates scaffold the construction of emotional experience, or the way we "do emotions". Doing emotions is always moral or immoral by these cultural mandates, i.e., either consistent or inconsistent with the cultural standards. Our research has revealed a "cultural logic" to emotional experience. First, both the type and the content of emotions differ across cultures, in ways that are conducive to the respective cultural mandates. Second, experiencing emotions that are conducive to the cultural mandate is associated with greater well-being. Finally, the interpersonal and collective processes within a culture scaffold emotional experiences that are consistent with the cultural mandate and help to avoid those that are not.

We measured emotional experience using a number of different self-report methods. While there is no way of ascertaining the degree to which self-reported emotions reflect an individual's experience, self-reports are the only and best way to approximate experience (Barrett et al., 2007). In fact, even neuroscientific, physiological, and behavioural research on emotions heavily relies on self-report measures to distinguish between emotional experiences and interpret their findings. Still, self-reports of emotions are

subject to retrospective bias and normative or socially desirable answering (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Therefore, one question pertinent to our research is whether our findings reflect cultural differences in actual emotional experience. Although some degree of socially desirable responding cannot be ruled out, there are several reasons to assume that experiences themselves differ as well.

First, we used a variety of methods, some of which are less subject to socially desirable responding, and regardless of the method used, we found that emotional responding was consistent with the cultural mandates. For instance, the patterns of our results are consistent whether we directly ask participants to report their emotions (Kitayama et al., 2006) or ask them to report the emotions an average member of their culture would have (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013)—a method known to counter socially desirable responding (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Kitayama et al., 1997). Furthermore, the culturally different patterns of emotions yielded by self-report in diary studies corresponded with emotions that appeared to be situationally promoted; yet, situational promotion of emotions was calculated by regressing the reported frequency of a situation onto the intensity of the emotion elicited by that situation. It is hard to imagine participants keeping track of the association between their answers to these questions. It is conceivable that participants recall situations that elicit culturally valued emotions, but the emotions reported in response to situations reported by participants from other cultures were also consistent with the cultural mandate. Our findings on well-being similarly suggest that regardless of whether we predict well-being from self-reports of emotions or from fit scores, there is an association between culturally normative emotions and well-being; it is hard to imagine that the implicit measure that is used to calculate fit scores is subject to socially desirable responding. Finally, emotion norms as reflected in collective processes are clearly not consciously accessible to individuals: We doubt that people would be able to report the word associations found in our big representative samples of native speakers (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013). Yet again, these collective processes similarly reflect cultural mandates.

A second way to address the concern about the veracity of cultural differences in emotional experience is theoretical. There is good reason to believe that "doing emotions" is always informed by cultural mandates; hence, the construction of emotions may itself be subject to the same forces that would affect socially desirable responding. For instance, several studies have found a high correlation between ideal or normative emotions and self-reported "actual" emotion (Eid & Diener, 2001; Tsai et al., 2006). It is certainly worth distinguishing between situations in which people are

merely driven by self-presentational goals, and situations in which this is less the case. Yet, a constructivist perspective on emotions suggests that the very experience of emotions is scaffolded by our knowledge about what is right and normal in the culture (Barrett, 2017; Mesquita, 2010; Mesquita & Boiger, 2014; Shweder et al., 2008). This appears to be as true in our own culture as in other cultures. Therefore, a constructivist perspective on emotional experience sheds a different light on the question of veracity itself.

Considered in the round, our findings support the idea that there are non-random cultural differences in both the types and content of emotion. Emotions that foster or highlight ideas about what constitutes a good person, good relationships, or moral behaviour are experienced more frequently and intensely, whereas emotions that violate or undermine these ideas are experienced more rarely. Similarly, the appraisals and action tendencies that are associated with a particular emotion differ across cultures in ways that create instances of emotion that are consistent with the respective cultural mandates. Both types of evidence suggest that "doing emotions" is a goal-driven process; in each culture, the cultural mandate is an important goal behind doing emotions.

Many forces will act upon individuals to "do emotions" in ways that are consistent with the cultural mandates. Our research has shown how people, both individually and collectively, produce emotions that fit the cultural mandate (see also De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2013; Mesquita, De Leersnyder, & Albert, 2014). In everyday life, it is impossible to distinguish between individual and collective forces of emotion construction. However, our research allows a glimpse into the ways people from different cultural contexts individually construct different types of emotions in the same situations, such that their constructed emotions match their own cultural mandate. For instance, when American and Japanese participants recounted instances of similar types of events, Americans reported more disengaging emotions, whereas Japanese reported more engaging emotions (Kitayama et al., 2006, Study 2). Similarly, when American, Japanese, Belgian, and Turkish participants evaluated a given set of situations, their emotional constructions were in line with their own culture's specific mandate, irrespective of whether the situations originated from their own culture or one of the other cultures (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013; Boiger et al., 2014; Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013). These findings suggest that, at the individual level, emotions are constructed to fulfil the cultural mandates, even in the case of situations that do not originate from the same culture.

Our research also sheds light on the collective construction of emotion. Collectively, people promote or allow for interactions (or other situations) that elicit emotions that are consistent with their culture's mandate, but discourage or avoid situations that elicit emotions that make achieving their

cultural mandate less likely (Boiger, Mesquita et al., 2013; Güngör, Karasawa, Boiger, Dincer, & Mesquita, 2014). Similarly, in dyadic interactions, people appear to have more elaborate scripts for regulating emotions that are central to the cultural mandate than for emotions that are not, and they thus learn to expect and consider each other's responses to those emotions—something that appears to be less the case for emotions that are not privileged in their culture (Boiger et al., 2016). Finally, emotions are collectively represented in (children's) books and language in ways that fit the cultural mandates (Boiger, De Deyne et al., 2013); these descriptive norms are likely to become an inherent part of emotional meaning, and also work prescriptively to affect individuals' construction of emotional experience.

Research unpacking the processes involved in the sociocultural construction of emotions is in its infancy. We imagine that cultural mandates operate at a deeply psychological level. One way in which cultural mandates may operate is by highlighting the values by which emotional situations get meaning. In support of this idea, several studies have established the link between the type of emotions experienced and the value priorities, either in the culture generally (Tamir et al., 2016) or in particular situations (De Leersnyder, Koval, Kuppens, & Mesquita, in press). Cultural mandates may also enter emotion construction by affecting interpersonal emotion regulation. In addition to creating the interpersonal situations that give rise to emotions, other people (partners, friends, colleagues) regulate an individual's emotions. Others will reward and reinforce emotions that are consistent with cultural mandates, but respond unfavourably and try to change emotions that are inconsistent, likely leading to adjustments of the individual's emotions towards the cultural mandate. Finally, cultural mandates may operate in the different ways that we have shown: emotion scripts, exemplars, and language all scaffold experiences that are consistent with the cultural mandates because they make certain ways of doing emotions available and accessible. We do not think of cultural mandates as top-down forces that are alien to the individual, and impose feelings or displays on an individual; in that sense, the concept of cultural mandates is different from other inferred concepts, such as "display rules" and "feeling rules" (Hochschild, 1983; Matsumoto et al., 2008).

Cultural differences in emotions are not superficial. They are not the "noise" around otherwise universal emotions. As the cultural psychologist, Richard Shweder, phrased it some 25 years ago: "the so-called 'noise' is not really noise at all; it is the message" (Shweder, 1991, p. 99). Our research has attempted to adequately understand the cross-cultural "noise" as a "message". Importantly, it suggests the mutual constitution of culture and emotion. Culturally normative emotions help the individual to engage in the culture's social interactions and relationships; these interactions and relationships, in turn, are conducive to the experience of those emotions.

If doing emotions is a goal-directed process, then future research on emotions should study emotions in settings that are goal-relevant. One can question the extent to which decontextualised emotional stimuli presented on a computer screen to a participant in a scanner or a research cubicle can capture these goal-directed processes. Future emotion research should seek to have a clearer focus on the ways in which emotions are constructed in everyday life: in dynamically unfolding interactions that form parts of our relationships with other people, and in a particular cultural context. Doing emotions is embedded in the different layers of context—the interaction, the relationship, and the cultural context (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012)—that give it its meaning and direction. Future research should, therefore, study how emotions are constructed as people interact in a specific relationship, with its own interpersonal history and meaning system, which is in turn embedded in a broader sociocultural context that has specific meanings and practices.

Finally, our research suggests that emotional fit is rewarding. One way to understand this is that culturally normative emotions help one to be the kind of person and to engage in the relationships that are valued in the culture, and thereby promote acceptance and belonging. This finding has important implications for intercultural emotional interactions. When people from different cultures "do emotions", they may literally be at "cross purposes": Emotions achieving one person's cultural mandate may be in conflict with another person's cultural mandate. It follows from our analysis that emotional interaction at "cross purposes" may be an important obstacle to smooth intercultural relationships and the well-being of immigrant minorities (see also Consedine, Chentsova-Dutton, & Krivoshekova, 2014; De Leersnyder et al., 2011). Future work should document these difficulties, and start to develop solutions that are relevant to diverse practices and settings, such as minority education, intercultural therapy, and multicultural work settings.

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